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Abstract 
The complex structure of transnational corporations and the inadequacy of the anti-tax 
avoidance measures introduced by governments, constitute the issue of tax avoidance high in the 
economic and political agenda globally.  Tax avoidance schemes conducted by major multinational 
corporations caused several concerns to the public, domestic businesses, governments and tax 
administrations as well as to the respective transnational groups themselves.  The compulsory 
repayment of unpaid tax liability by groups such as Google and Apple had no impact whatsoever on the 
legislative field.  What is even more interesting, is the fact that such tax avoidance schemes are granted 
unintentionally by legislative instruments and enable the use of specific methods for engagement in tax 
avoidance schemes.  The success of such schemes is not always guaranteed as every year, the 
number of anti-tax avoidance measures is increased.  To explore the issue of tax avoidance, the 
methods of tax avoidance will be identified and the relevant anti-tax avoidance measures will be 
demonstrated.  The thesis argues that significant reforms are needed when the economy of jurisdictions 
is at stake. 
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Introduction: 
The objective goal and aspiration of every corporation, regardless of the size, composition and 
nature, has always been to achieve profitability.  During the past decades and up to now, the 
accomplishment of this goal can be attained through the expansion of corporate activities internationally.  
Nevertheless, the effective operation of a corporation in multiple jurisdictions, necessitates among other 
things, knowledge of the respective tax systems to avoid legal and financial incidents.  The 
internationalization exposes corporations to constant tax risks as they are forced to operate under 
various and often unstable tax regimes.  Taxes by definition are compulsory means of transferring the 
resources of citizens and corporations to the respective state. This compulsory nature, coupled with the 
fact that they directly reduce the citizens' income and the corporation profits, affect their compliance 
with the tax system and they stand opposed to the tax regimes; thereby, the phenomenon of tax 
avoidance and other forms of non-compliance is gradually increasing. Tax avoidance, is carried out in 
the context of an often complex tax plan, which aims the minimization of tax liability within the law.  Tax 
avoidance schemes are usually characterized by the exploitation of ambiguities or ‘loopholes’ of tax 
legislation as opposed to the intentions of the legislator.  In addition, in the past few years, mass 
marketed tax avoidance schemes have cause considerable concern to the public.  The public has 
expressed its opposition to tax avoidance schemes through countless of protests, campaigns and 
boycotts.  Major transnational groups (operating in multiple jurisdictions) are constantly taking 
advantage of the tax system while they are enabled by law and governments around the globe are 
constantly introducing measures to tackle such schemes.   
The particular thesis aims to examine whether the anti-tax avoidance measures taken by the 
United Kingdom, United States and Europe, are adequate enough in regards to the elimination of tax 
avoidance in transnational groups and whether they are in need of reform.  In the first chapter, a general 
background will be given on the concepts of ‘tax’ and tax avoidance.  The thesis will provide the 
definition of tax and its interpretation with a brief reference on its purpose.  Then, the concept of tax 
avoidance will be analysed in depth.  More particularly, its definition and interpretation, the legal or 
illegal dilemma will be provided while it is going to be differentiated from other forms of non-compliance.  
In the second chapter, the main methods and strategies of engaging in tax avoidance will be identified 
such as the misuse of the doctrines of limited liability and separate legal personality, the use of 
intellectual property and transfer pricing, and they are going to unfold the reasons behind it.  In order to 
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identify the extent of the issue of tax avoidance, the thesis will refer to two prominent and controversial 
case studies, namely the case of Google and Apple which will demonstrate in practise the application 
of the methods.  The examples will also manifest the well-needed urgency for reforms in the tax system.  
In Chapter 3, the measures taken for counteracting tax avoidance by the UK, the USA and Europe will 
be identified.  Finally, Chapter 4 will evaluate the measures taken by the relevant bodies and establish 
whether they are adequate enough in preventing tax avoidance schemes from distorting the legal 
framework and the society in general. 
For the purposes of this thesis, there will be a use of both primary and secondary sources.  The 
study will adopt the legal method of analysing case law, statute law, books, articles, journals and other 
written material.  Since references are made on foreign jurisdictions (outside the UK), there are few 
foreign legal materials including statute law.  The study also necessitates the use of online materials as 
a number of measures and legal rules are currently in the process of being enforced or they will be 
enforced in the near future. 
 
Chapter 1: The Concept of Tax and Tax Avoidance 
The Concept of tax 
In most countries in the world, small, medium and large businesses and corporations, 
individuals and other legal entities are already acquainted with the term ‘tax’.  It is a universal term 
which is crucial to the functioning of the economy in a domestic and an international level.  But what is 
tax, what is its purpose and what is the cause of its vital importance?  First of all, tax is a generic term; 
it is subjected to different interpretations in the legal, economic and political environment and it varies 
among jurisdictions.  A common interpretation might be a governmental charge imposed to the citizens’ 
income and corporations’ profits.  Otherwise is supplemented to transactions, goods and services1.  The 
first is regarded as a direct taxation while the latter an indirect method of taxation.  In the same view, 
the interpretative guide of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (hereinafter 
                                                          
1 Dine, Janet & Koutsias, Marios, ‘The Three Shades of Tax Avoidance of Corporate Groups: Company Law, 
Ethics and the Multiplicity of Jurisdictions Involved’, European Business Law Review 30, no. 1 (2019), 151 
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OECD) interprets the term ‘tax’ as to be confined to “compulsory, unrequited payment to general 
government”2 .  The public opinion perceives taxation, as a mandatory and inevitable process; a 
compulsory contribution to the government that is required to abide with.  However, both interpretations 
have been widely criticized for a number of reasons.  First of all, tax is often misled as to being only 
imposed in incomes and profits.  This is of course not true since tax is imposed in almost everything; 
invested savings, pensions, rents, inheritance and wealth, gains and occupation of property and in 
exchange of services3.  There is a great variety of taxes which are equally necessary even though the 
most profitable to the government is the tax subjected to the income.   
Murphy views on taxation are based upon the fact that taxes are anything but compulsory.  He 
claims that even though tax is a concept originally created a few centuries back by the government, 
government and democracy are concepts that we agreed upon.  Since functioning democracy means 
we have the right to elect and be elected, vote and be voted, we also have the right to influence the 
democratic process and hence, we are not excluded from the tax-making process4.  Tax is optional 
rather compulsory since our consent is evident to the operation of the government; if not, government 
is not the one to blame.  A fact to support this view is the estimated tax gap calculated by Her Majesty's 
Revenue and Customs (HMRC) which is responsible for the collection of taxes.  Tax gap is the 
difference between the actual amount of tax that should, in theory, be paid and what is actually paid to 
the HMRC.  Between 2017 and 2018, the tax revenues were estimated to 690 billion pounds 5 .  
Respectively, the tax gap was approximately 34.8 billion pounds and among them, only 3.9 billion 
pounds were outstanding due to non-payment reasons6.  Therefore, one might argue that since the 
amount is significantly small comparing to the tax revenues, most taxpayers willingly conform to their 
tax liabilities.  Tax gap measures the degree of non-compliance which is affected by the willingness of 
                                                          
2 OECD, <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/tax/indicator-group/english_76e12892-en> accessed on 15 
July 2019 
3 Richard Murphy, The Joy of Tax, 30 (Bantam Press, 2015) 
4 Ibid. 31 
5 Helen Miller, Barra Roantree, ‘Tax revenues: where does the money come from and what are the next 
government’s challenges?’ (Institute for Fiscal Studies, 1 May 2017) 
<https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/9178> accessed on 15 July 2019 
6 HMRC, ‘Measuring tax gaps 2019 edition: Tax gap estimates for 2017-18’ (20 June 2019), 4 at 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/820979
/Measuring_tax_gaps_2019_edition.pdf> accessed on 15 July 2019  
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taxpayers to comply with their tax liabilities.  The compliance is referring to the behaviour of the taxpayer 
and whether they comply voluntarily or involuntarily.   
 
Purpose of tax 
The purpose of the tax also varies.  It is considered as a contribution to the revenue of the state 
in order to enable and complement the operations of the government or the country7.  One might argue 
that by having tax liability, we indirectly contribute to the development of public transportation, education, 
rise of job opportunities, goods and services.  The purpose and the spending of the tax along with other 
non-taxes are reflected each year by the Budget.  The Budget (Financial Statement) is a statement 
which outlines the finance and the economy of the state and proposals for reforming taxation by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer to the House of Commons8.  It also includes predictions for the economy 
by the Office for Budget Responsibility (ORB).  In accordance with the latest Budget of 2018, the main 
use of the Budget was for social protection purposes.  Following, are the health purposes, education, 
defence, debt interest, public order and safety, transport, personal social services and housing 
purposes9.  There is a suggestion that taxation mainly exists for governmental purposes.  To meet 
planned expenditure, raise the revenue of the state, reduce any deficits and consequently, balance their 
books to prevent deflation.  A question may arise regarding the essentiality and the role of taxation in 
the function of the government.  Some may argue that printing, coining or borrowing money could be 
sufficient to raise the necessary amount for the government’s spending, especially in countries with 
monetary sovereignty over their currencies.  If there are other ways to raise the amount needed, why 
government keeps emphasizing on collecting taxes?   
 
The concept of Tax Avoidance as a form of non-compliance 
Since 2012, a lot of public attention has been given on tax related issues.  After a number of 
tax avoidance incidents occurred in major corporate groups, questions were raised regarding the 
                                                          
7 Dine, Koutsias (n1) 
8 HM Treasury, Budget 2018, HC 1629, (October 2018) 4,5 
9 Ibid. 
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consequences of those incidents, about the flexibility of the law and those who enforce it.  Major 
corporate groups such as Google Inc., Apple Inc., Starbucks Inc. and Amazon.com Inc., through 
different methods were able not only to commit tax avoidance schemes but they were also successful.  
Worth mentioning, is the fact that tax avoidance has caused more concerns than any other method of 
non-compliance.   
Definition and Interpretation 
In order to understand what tax avoidance is, we also need to take into consideration what it is 
not; tax planning and tax evasion.  There are no statutory definitions or “universally applied legal 
definitions” and usually, their meaning will be determined by the context they will be used10.  They are 
means of minimizing the tax liability, they are forms of non-compliance and usually are being used 
interchangeably, although they differ.  In an effort to define and distinguish their differences, it is 
necessary to point out that the general idea is that tax planning is completely legal (compliant with the 
letter and the spirit of the law) and tax evasion is completely illegal.  That being said, it is argued that 
tax avoidance stands somewhere in between them; compliant with the letter of the law, but not with the 
spirit of the law11.  However, this is not always the case since ‘’there will be occasions when the line is 
a little blurred’’. 
Tax planning is the legal arrangement of affairs or a planned strategy by which tax efficiency 
and minimization of tax liability is achieved12.  It offers an insight of the total taxes of a person or a 
business will owe after a period of time so more benefits can be presented.  It was described as the 
use of tax reliefs ‘’for the purpose for which they were intended’’.  More specifically, the intended 
purpose is determined by whether the tax reliefs are within the scope and the intentions of the 
Parliament, within the spirit of the law.  For instance, actions such as claiming for tax relief on capital 
investments, making contributions to a pension scheme or saving in an individual savings account (ISA) 
where the tax is exempt, are all considered as tax planning.  In the UK and USA, it is even encouraged 
by the HMRC and the IRS (tax authorities) since they provide deductions, benefits and even exemptions 
                                                          
10 HC Deb 24 May 2006 ccWA111-2 
11 HC Deb 12 July 2010 c706 
12 ‘Glossary of Tax Terms’ (OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration) 
<https://www.oecd.org/ctp/glossaryoftaxterms.htm> accessed on 18 July 2019 
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in many forms of taxation to encourage business investments, secured healthcare and so on.  In 
contrast with tax planning, tax evasion is the illegal act of “deliberately not declaring or accounting what 
is owed” and the taxable activity is hidden from the tax authorities13.  To be more specific, tax evasion 
is the intentional misrepresentation of the tax affairs, either by understating the profits or overstating the 
losses at the detriment of the government.  For instance, a taxpayer receives a certain amount of income 
but the amount declared to the relevant authority is deliberately different.   
To continue with, tax avoidance is the use of tax regimes within the law, in order to eliminate 
the amount of taxes owed to the government.  It can be also considered the action of “bending the rules 
of the tax system to gain a tax advantage” in a way that the Parliament did not intend14.  It can be argued 
that the main difference between tax evasion and tax avoidance, is with the former being illegal and the 
latter being legal.  However, tax avoidance in an aggressive form can be considered illegal.  The 
aggressive form can be determined by whether it is beyond of the intentions of the Parliament.  In such 
cases, actions can be taken so the tax system can be fair and everyone will pay according to their tax 
threshold15.  So when does tax avoidance ceases to be legal? 
In an attempt to define tax avoidance, Parliament tried to determine the confines of tax 
avoidance and to set the path for a more coherent understanding of the term.  In previous debates, a 
distinction was drawn between the exploitation of the tax system and simple compliance with the law16.  
It was also established that parliamentary intention is one of the elements that differentiates the forms 
of non-compliance.  Although we can argue that parliamentary intention is what the lawmakers had in 
mind when enacting a particular statute, its meaning was subjected to criticism17.  It is a concept which 
is much debated in legal literature and it should be distinguished from colloquial usage and ordinary 
language18.  Lord Nicholls explained further by clarifying that tax avoidance is an objective concept 
‘’which the court reasonably imputes to Parliament in respect of the language used’’19.  Tax avoidance 
                                                          
13 HM Treasury, Tackling tax evasion & avoidance, Cm 9047 (March 2015) 5 (Box 1.A: Clarifying tax 
terminology) 
14 HM Treasury, Tackling tax avoidance, evasion, and other forms of non-compliance, (March 2019) 7 
15 HM Treasury, Budget 2018, HC 1629, (October 2018) 51 (3.76) 
16 Antony Seely, Tax avoidance and tax evasion (House of Commons Library Briefing Paper CBP-7948, 2019) < 
https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7948> accessed on 20 July 2019 
17 Ibid. 6 
18 Ibid. 7  
19 R v Secretary of State for Environment, Transport and the Regions [2001] 2 AC 349 
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is unfamiliar with the subjective opinions of the members involved in the process of the enactment of 
the legislation20.  Consequently, it is the parliamentary process producing the text of legislation, whilst 
the intention is found by the courts in view of the wording of that legislation21.  Nevertheless, a different 
dimension to the issue is given by Lord Hoffman who expressed his concerns regarding the role of the 
HMRC on tax avoidance22.  His beliefs are based upon the fact that HMRC advise the legislators to 
produce legislation “by reference to substance rather than form” and therefore, resulting to the 
incapability of the courts to recognize the economic effect of the transactions23.  He also claims where 
this is true, where legal concepts conflict with economic substance, problems occur.  The difficulty on 
countering tax schemes is the precision that they have with the letter of law and this is why he suggests 
that legislature should demonstrate its intention more clearly24. 
 
Chapter 2:  The Methods of tax avoidance and the Case studies of Google and Apple 
Moving on, since we have established a general background on the forms of non-compliance, 
it is of significant importance to focus on tax avoidance and more specifically, the means as well as the 
main reasons for participating in such schemes.  To provide a coherent description in what exactly 
businesses and transnational groups engage in, we have to take a step back and consider the 
foundations of company law.  By examining these foundations, we will establish the main component 
that allows transnational groups to engage in such schemes.  
 
Methods 
Limited Liability and Separate Legal Personality 
Companies are founded upon two doctrines which are closely linked and they can be regarded 
as the cornerstones of company law; the principle of separate legal personality and the principle of 
                                                          
20 Ibid. 
21 Black-Clawson International Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg AG [1975] A.C. 591 (Lord Reid) at 613 
22 Judith Freeman, ‘Interpreting tax statutes: tax avoidance and the intention of the Parliament’, Law Quarterly 
Review 2007 at 72 
23 The Rt Hon. Lord Hoffmann, “Tax Avoidance” [2005] B.T.R. 197 at 206 
24 Freeman (n22) 73 
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limited liability25.  Through these doctrines, an incorporated company is to be recognised as a single 
entity with a separate legal existence distinct from the individuals that compose it.  Therefore, it has a 
capacity similar to a natural person with rights and obligations, and is rendered able to enter into   hence, 
the company will incur any liability.26  Except from the exclusion of the individuals from any liability in 
regards of the company’s actions, it also functions as a protection shield on their personal assets. Thus, 
the privileges granted by the doctrines, did not only enable a maximisation of the investments and 
minimisation of the risks, but also benefited claimants who desire to proceed in legal actions against 
the company.  This is because the approach of taking legal action against the company is easier that 
trying to identify the members that compose it.  In regards to the limited liability doctrine, individuals are 
only liable for the extent of their investment and contribution to the company. In addition, in a single 
company, the application and the effect of the doctrines is straightforward.  Nevertheless, in corporate 
groups and especially in transnational groups, things get much more complex.   
Firstly, corporate groups and transnational groups are groups of parent and subsidiary 
companies with the latter operating beyond national level.  The concept of transnational groups refers 
to the integration of businesses into a broader entity that has a financial and administrative unity whilst 
the parent company exercises central authority over its members.  Due to their multi-tier corporate 
structure, the doctrines grant a further layer of protection to the parent company from its subsidiaries’ 
liability of obligations and the subsidiaries are also protected from liability of the other fragments of the 
corporate group27.  However, in transnational groups the protection is even more increased.  The reason 
is that a claimant who seeks to take legal action against the group, will face more difficulties than 
claiming against a single company due to the multiplicity of jurisdictions involved in the group28.  Again, 
that adds to an additional protection on the group which they can take advantage of.  The fundamental 
doctrines which gradually formed the privileges of the corporation world as we know it today, have also 
been functioning beyond their original objectives 29 .  Instead of focussing on the protection of 
shareholders and investors, they enable corporate groups and transnational groups to ‘misuse’ the 
                                                          
25 Phillip I. Blumberg, ‘Limited Liability and Corporate Groups’, Journal of Corporation Law 11 J. Corp. L. (1985-
1986) 574 
26 Amanda Pinto QC & Martin Evans, Corporate Criminal Liability (Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd edn) 9 
27 Blumberg (n25) 575 
28 Dine, Koutsias (n1) 156 
29 Blumberg (n25) 575 
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doctrines in an unethical way.  For instance, in the United States, the acquisition of shares of other 
companies was prohibited and was not acceptable till the end of nineteenth century.  As soon as the 
permission was granted, three large corporations took the opportunity to transform into major multi-tier 
corporate groups due to this development30. Nevertheless, it was well established that the limited liability 
doctrine expanded in a dramatic way (beyond its original objective of protecting the interests and assets 
of the company’s members) but without any recognition or willingness to address the issue.  Today, it 
is argued that many transnational groups, built their structure in such a way in order to “escape the 
difficulty, if not the impossibility, of qualifying the parent company as a foreign corporation in a particular 
state…the avoidance of taxation…the desire for limited liability”31.  Therefore, in some instances, 
despite the liability that the parent company will escape, the motive might be the avoidance of taxation.  
In addition, no one can deny the multiple benefits that the doctrines have to offer; not only to the 
corporate sector but to the path to an efficient economic system in general.  Nevertheless, a re-
examination of the doctrines and their application, is an issue of foremost importance and if changed, 
it could prevent many tax avoidance schemes. 
 
Intellectual Property and Transfer pricing 
Intellectual property is regarded as “the leading tax-avoidance vehicle” for transnational 
groups32.  They extensively use intellectual property transactions in an attempt to decrease or overall 
elude from their tax liabilities.  Patents, copyrights and trademarks can be easily transferred cross-
border through an intellectual property assignment agreement which is the “transfer of an owner’s rights, 
title and interest in certain intellectual property rights”33.  Unlike tangible property (hardware or assets), 
intellectual property facilitates tax avoidance schemes due to its nature.  Firstly, it can be transferred to 
a tax haven very easily34.  A tax haven is the term which refers to a country that imposes very low 
                                                          
30 Ibid. 
31 William Douglas, Carrol Shanks, ‘Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations’ 39 Yale Law 
Journal 193 (1929) 
32 Andrew Blair-Stanek, 'Intellectual Property Law Solutions to Tax Avoidance' (2015) 62 UCLA L Rev 2, 4 
33 ‘What is the purpose of an intellectual property assignment agreement?’ (European IP Helpdesk) 
<https://www.iprhelpdesk.eu/node/2569> accessed on 21 July 2019 
34 Yariv Brauner, ‘Value in the Eye of the Beholder: The Valuation of Intangibles or Transfer Pricing Purposes’ 
(2008) 28 Virginia Tax Review 79, 88 
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effective tax rates or even no tax rates.  Transnational groups often exploit the low taxation in tax havens 
to avoid tax “which otherwise would be payable in a high-tax country”35.  Secondly, the distinctiveness 
of each piece of intellectual property and its nature, constitutes really difficult to establish its precise 
market value.  Thus, transnational groups use and justify their artificial low market values and as a 
consequence, they acquire really low tax assessments36.  The mechanisms which are being used and 
by which the profits are being allocated between the fragments of the group, are the transfer pricing 
and licensing. 
Transfer pricing is a mechanism which facilitates transnational groups with the ability to 
fluctuate the prices of their goods and services accordingly to their own interests.  Concerning single 
unrelated entities, the terms and conditions, as well as the prices of their goods and services when they 
trade with each other are set by the market37.  Nevertheless, in multi-tier groups the prices of the 
transactions are not necessarily set by the market, but by other factors which aim to the minimization 
of tax liability and costs.  Those prices do not reflect an independent market price38.  Therefore, through 
transfer pricing, a group has the ability to allocate its earnings among the subsidiaries accordingly, shift 
their taxable income and thereby affect its overall tax liability.  Moving on, groups also eliminate their 
tax liability by using licensing fees.  More specifically, the tax haven in which the profits of the group are 
being transferred, usually “licenses all patent rights”.  Every subsidiary that wishes to trade any of the 
goods or services under the specific brand, name or trademark, should pay to the ‘tax haven’ an amount 
for licensing fees in order to acquire the right to trade.  Those licensing fees are subjected to a low tax 
rate since they are being given by a low tax country.  Furthermore, all the patents’ profits earned by the 
subsidiaries, will be accumulated to the tax haven, along with some other costs which we will be 
deducted once again from their tax liability39.  Therefore, transfer pricing is one of the most common 
methods for tax avoidance schemes and this is why is a major concern for tax authorities.  Nevertheless, 
it should not be always associated with tax related schemes; but in some instances, it is used for such 
purposes.  Its use may result in the deduction of taxable profits in every jurisdiction involved40 and since 
                                                          
35 OECD Glossary (n12) 
36 Blair-Stanek (n32) 5 
37 Dine, Koutsias (n1) 167 
38 European Commission, ‘Transfer pricing in the EU context’, Taxation and Customs Union 
<https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-tax/transfer-pricing-eu-context_en> accessed on 
21 July 2019 
39 Dine, Koutsias (n1) 167 
40 European Commission (n38) 
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it concerns mainly transnational groups, it is rational to assume that the amount of the unpaid tax liability 
is usually considerable.   
 
Arm’s Length Principle 
The extended use of transfer pricing has caused several concerns, to the point that a principle 
was introduced in an international basis; the so called “arm’s length” principle.  The principle “represents 
the international consensus on the valuation, for income tax purposes, of cross-border transactions 
between associated enterprises”41.  It is the transfer pricing standard that the member countries of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (hereinafter OECD) have agreed upon to 
use, in order to substantiate the prices in intra-group transactions.  The main objectives of the principle 
are the correction of any distortions arising when prices do not reflect the market values, the prevention 
of any tax advantages or disadvantages, the maintenance of fairness between all corporate entities42 
as well as the promotion of the growth of international trade and investment.43  The principle is being 
defined by Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention.  “Conditions (prices but not only) are made or 
imposed between the two enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which differ from those 
which would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those 
conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so 
accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly”44.  In other words, a 
transaction between related parties (companies within the same group) is consistent with the principle, 
if the subsequent profits are equivalent to the profits that would be obtained by independent parties, if 
they carried out similar transactions under the same circumstances.  The arm’s length principle is 
implemented in the form of royalties; a payment from the parent company to the subsidiary established 
                                                          
41 ‘OECD releases latest updates to the Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations’ (OECD, 10 July 2017) < https://www.oecd.org/tax/oecd-releases-latest-updates-to-the-
transfer-pricing-guidelines-for-multinational-enterprises-and-tax-administrations.htm> accessed on 22 July 
2019 
42 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, Chapter 1: The 
Arm’s Length Principle (2017), 34 at:  <https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/oecd-transfer-pricing-guidelines-
for-multinational-enterprises-and-tax-administrations-2017_tpg-2017-en#page39> accessed on 22 July 2019 
43 Ibid. 36 
44 OECD Model Tax Convention, Articles of the Model Convention with respect to taxes on income and on 
capital, Art. 9 
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in the low tax country for the use of its intellectual property45.  Nevertheless, tax authorities should “not 
automatically assume that associated enterprises have sought to manipulate their profits”46.  There 
might be other elements affecting the ability of the enterprises in the group to establish a price that it is 
determined by the market.  At this point, it is important to mention that OECD drafted some guidelines 
which includes the application of transfer pricing as well as the arm’s length principle. Throughout the 
guidelines, there are many provisions which do not compel the immediate intervention when non-
compliant practices occur; hence the groups, can take advantage of the guidelines as a mean of 
justifying their prices once again. In addition, the OECD guidelines is a piece of soft law without any 
strict or definite provisions.  Member countries are not obliged to comply with the guidelines but they 
are advised to do so in order to avoid any disputes.  Other attempts of tackling tax avoidance will be 
identified at a later stage. 
 
Case Studies 
The following case studies, will provide an illustration of the aforementioned methods that 
transnational groups use in order to engage in tax avoidance schemes.  They will also demonstrate 
certain patterns of behavior that it are similar among many transnational groups and thus, they will 
indicate the extent and the severity of the tax avoidance issue.  Nevertheless, before analyzing the case 
studies, it is essential to note and highlight the role of Ireland in the tax avoidance context and to provide 
a background on its taxation policies. 
 
Ireland as a ‘tax haven’ 
As it will be seen, Ireland played a key role in two of the most controversial and immense tax 
avoidance schemes of the past few years.  Ireland is considered one of the tax havens due to the its 
taxation rates and economic policies.  According to a Working Paper by the National Bureau of 
Economic Research – an American nonprofit economic research organization – there are many other 
                                                          
45 Dine, Koutsias (n1) 167 
46 OECD Guidelines (n42) 33 
17 
 
countries which have been considered as ‘tax havens’ throughout the years and among others, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, Singapore, Bermuda and Caribbean havens47.  The corporate 
tax rate in Ireland is currently 12.5%48 which is amongst the lowest in Europe49, whilst in the UK is 
currently 19%50 and in the USA is currently 21% (after the enforcement of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act)51.  
It may also be argued that Ireland is not a tax haven.  Despite the views of some academics who 
characterize Ireland as a tax haven, Ireland is fully compliant with the criteria established by the OECD 
on what constitutes a tax haven.  Since there is no legal and definite interpretation of the term ‘tax 
haven’, these criteria function as an alternative definition depending on the degree of compliance.  In 
any case, the characterization of Ireland as tax haven or not, does not change the fact that transnational 
groups can take advantage of the benefits provided by the country and it is still regarded as an attractive 
destination for either investments or establishing a company52. 
 
The Case of Google 
One of the main controversial tax avoidance schemes is the case of Google LLC since it ended 
up “with stateless income, nowhere taxed”53.   Google LLC is one of the biggest and well-known online 
services, computer software and web search engine corporations in the world with hundreds of 
subsidiaries around the globe.  In 2017, Google announced plans of reforming and rearranging its 
structure and status from a corporation to a limited liability company since Alphabet Inc. acquired the 
web search giant.  Google LLC’s strategy in their controversial tax avoidance scheme was the so called 
“Double Irish Dutch Sandwich”.  It is the tax strategy in which the company has legal residence in one 
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country but location for tax purposes is another country54.  This technique involves the arrangement of 
transactions (intellectual property) between subsidiary companies established both in Ireland and in the 
Netherlands55. Then, transnational groups can shift their profits from one subsidiary to the other in order 
to exploit the low tax rate or the no tax rate of the jurisdictions.   
In 2003, before its initial public offering, the then, Google Inc. entered into an agreement with 
an Irish subsidiary (Google Ireland Holdings) in order to transfer a part of its intellectual property and 
rights for its search and advertising technologies regarding the regions of Europe, Africa and Middle 
East.  Despite the fact that the subsidiary was incorporated in Ireland, it was managed in Bermuda56.  
Therefore, the residency of the subsidiary for tax purposes is in Bermuda where the corporate tax is at 
0% tax rate.  Another Irish subsidiary came into the scene, the Ireland Limited which possessed the 
license for the technologies of Google Inc.57  To be more specific, any subsidiary or affiliate of Google 
Inc. in Europe, Africa and Middle East was granted a permission to use the company’s intellectual 
property and technologies only by acquiring the appropriate license from the Ireland Limited.  The 
process for obtaining license for their own use, was by paying royalties to the new subsidiary and thus, 
all the profits from the aforementioned regions were being taxed on the Ireland’s low corporate tax 
rate58.  The next step of the strategy, is to transfer the profits from Ireland to Bermuda where the 
corporate tax rate is at 0%.  It was made possible by directing Ireland Limited to pay royalties to the 
subsidiary in Bermuda (Google Ireland Holdings) so they could lessen their tax liability even more.  
 At this point, it is important to note that since 2003, a Directive is in force regulating matters on taxation 
of cross-border interest and royalty payments in the EU59.  The Directive abolished “any withholding 
taxes on royalty payments arising in a Member State, provided that the beneficial owner of the payment 
is a company or permanent establishment in another Member State”60.  In other words, Members States 
shall not impose any taxation on royalty payments between them.  For this reason, Ireland Limited 
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exploited this fact and instead of paying royalties plus taxation for transferring their profits to Bermuda, 
made a royalty payment to a shell company in Netherlands (Google BV)61.  Therefore, the payment was 
not subjected to any tax.  A shell company is basically non-existent; it exists only for financial purposes 
with usually no employees, offices or any business activity.  To continue with, Google BV transferred 
everything back to Google Ireland Holdings because again, the incorporation was in Ireland even 
though it was managed in Bermuda and hence, the royalty payment was tax-free62.   
Another important element of the strategy is the exploitation of the US law.  Among other 
countries, USA have enforced through legislation ‘controlled foreign corporations’ (CFC) rules63.  The 
objective of the rules is to confine “the tax deferral advantages of United States corporations operating 
businesses overseas through foreign corporations”64.  It can be argued that it is a set of anti-tax 
avoidance rules but with a few ‘loopholes’ which can be used in contrary with their objective.  For 
example, a company by establishing an ‘entity classification election’ can change the way it is being 
treated for US tax purposes and ‘disappear’, while maintaining its status for other financial matters65.  
Therefore, Ireland Limited and Google BV, were not regarded as companies by US law but as divisions 
of Google Ireland Holdings and thus, their corporate existence was only perceived by Europe.  For tax 
purposes, Ireland perceived Google Ireland Holdings as a tax resident of Bermuda, and USA as a tax 
resident of Ireland66.  Therefore, by taking advantage the contradictory and conflicting tax residencies 
rules and tax treaties by both jurisdictions, Google Inc. managed to claim ‘stateless’ status and thereby, 
its income was not subjected to any tax67. 
By conducting this tax strategy, in the period of 2006 to 2011, Google Inc. has managed to pay 
$16 million in corporation taxes in UK while generating the outstanding amount of $18 billion in sales 
which is equivalent to 0.1% tax rate and the 13% of their overall global sales68.  In accordance with the 
Committee of Public Accounts, Google Inc., defended its position by stating that it was compliant with 
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all the relevant laws and “paid the tax required by every company in every country in which it operates”69.   
The main argument of the company was “deeply unconvincing” to the Committee since they argued 
that Google’s sales in UK clients was taking place in Ireland.  The Committee was aware that the sales 
are billed in Ireland; however, most of the profits were attributed to UK staff70.  After the demonstration 
of evidence by both parties, the Committee concluded that the action of processing the sales through 
the Irish subsidiary “has no purpose other than to avoid UK corporation tax” and they also asserted that 
the role of the Irish subsidiary is very narrow.  In addition, they affirmed that based on evidence, most 
of the sales were actually conducted in UK, regardless of the allegation that they were conducted in 
Ireland; especially when the sales were in pound sterling and the payments in British banks71.  Again, 
in 2012, Google managed to pay only a tax liability of £11.6 million to the UK Treasury, despite earning 
the amount of £3.4 billion of conducting business in the UK. 
More recently, in 2014, the Irish government decided to ban the ‘Double Irish Dutch Sandwich’ 
strategy after European pressures emerged.  It was announced by the former Irish Finance Minister 
Michael Noonan that Ireland planned on changing their tax residency rules so as to avoid tax planning 
and tax avoidance schemes; it was enforced in the Budget 2015.  More specifically, as of January 2015, 
companies were no longer allowed to engage in the strategy; companies already engaging in the 
strategy were given a 5-year period to stop those practices72.  However, despite the fact that Ireland 
provided clearly and announced publicly its intention on to the abolishment of the ‘Double Irish’, Google 
Inc. persisted on practicing this strategy in the following years.  It is reported that in 2016, Google 
transferred the amount of $19.2 billion to its subsidiary in Bermuda and thereby, escaped approximately 
the extraordinary amount of $3.7 billion in taxes73.  The same year, the group was fined the amount of 
£130 million as a compensation for underpaying its UK taxes for at least a decade and got into a deal 
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by which it will face a greater tax burden in the future.  Many have disagreed with the amount that 
Google paid to the UK since it can be considered too ‘’tiny’’ and ‘’way short’’ in proportion to the profits 
that it had generated during the particular period of time.  Furthermore, the group is still under a lot of 
scrutiny for using its complex structure and escaping its tax liabilities74.  In 2017, after a six-year battle 
in the courts between Google and French tax authorities, it was held by the Paris Administrative Court, 
that Google’s parent company should not pay the $1.2 billion that was claimed.  The tax authorities’ 
argument was based on the fact that the parent company (Alphabet Inc.) and its Irish subsidiary (Google 
Ireland Limited), had been “selling a service for inserting online ads to clients in France for years through 
its Google search engine” from 2005 to 201075.  Nevertheless, the court argued that there were no 
permanent establishments of Google Ireland Limited in France via Google France (also subsidiary of 
Google) -under Article 4 (1) of the France-Ireland taxation treaty76- and thus, it is not to be imposed 
French taxes.  In addition, it was indicated that Google France did not acquire “the human resources or 
the technical means” to act respectively on its own77.  The French government appealed the decision 
of the Paris Administrative Court and in April 2019, the previous decision was approved by the Paris 
Administrative Court of Appeal in the same manner. 
 
The case of Apple 
As we have already established, one of the most attractive destinations for the implementation 
of tax strategies is Ireland.  Another transnational group which found itself in the center of attention for 
many years is Apple Inc.; one of the largest technological companies in the world along with Google 
LLC.  Strangely enough, the group was engaging for many years in the well-known ‘Double Irish and 
Dutch Sandwich’ scheme.  It managed to avoid billions and billions of dollars during the years of 
operating in that manner.  To begin with, Apple Inc. established in Ireland two subsidiaries; the Apple 
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Operations Europe (AOE) and the Apples Sales International (ASI)78.  The former, functions as a 
provider of services in the ‘EMEA’ (Europe, Middle East and Africa) while the latter functions as a 
provider and distributor of Apple goods.  ASI is fully owned 100% by AOE.  The US Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations had offered a description of the main activities of ASI.  It was provided 
that ASI enters into a contract with a company in China regarding the production of Apple’s goods.  
Then, the finished goods are shipped from China and while they are still in transit, ASI makes a payment 
for the goods and in this way, acquires the initial title of the goods.  At this point, ASI resales the goods 
to the “appropriate distribution entity, in most cases without taking physical possession of the goods in 
Ireland”79.  Thus, Apple has managed to set up its structure in such a way, that consumers in the EMEA, 
were entering into contract with ASI instead of the particular shop in the respective country.  In this way, 
all the profits were allocated to ASI even though the goods had no physical presence in Ireland80. 
Both subsidiaries have the right to sell intellectual property of Apple Inc. in other subsidiaries 
outside the USA under an agreement with the parent company while Apple Inc. remains with the legal 
ownership.  This constitutes to yearly payments from both the subsidiaries to Apple Inc. to “fund 
research and development efforts conducted on behalf of the Irish companies in the US”81.  In 2011, 
there is an estimated amount of $2 billion dollars on these payments and it was gradually increased82.  
However, these payments enabled the funding of more than half of all research by the group in the USA 
in order to enhance its intellectual property even more.  Of course, these payments are deductible from 
the subsidiaries’ revenues since expenses for research purposes are not to be subjected to any tax.  
Therefore, the taxable profits of the subsidiaries in Ireland is much lower.   
To continue with, the taxable income of the two subsidiaries were determined by two tax rulings 
issued by the Irish tax authorities; the one being in 1997 and the second one in 2007 (until 2015 when 
Ireland enforced a different corporate structure).  The particular tax rulings were agreements between 
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Ireland and the two subsidiaries as methods of calculating the internal allocation of their profits83.  The 
importance of these arrangements lays upon the fact that all the subsequent profits from the EMEA 
region flowed through Ireland and ASI.  According to the provisions of both rulings, most ASI’s profits 
would be attributed to the country of residence of the ‘home office’ to be taxed and only a sum of the 
remaining profits would be taxable in Ireland84.  This is because under Irish law, a company is resident 
for tax purposes if it is centrally managed and controlled in Ireland, irrespective of the country of 
incorporation.  In the USA, a company must be incorporated in the country regardless of its 
management or control.  Hence, the Irish subsidiaries are not tax residents in Ireland nor in the USA 
and they are being treated for tax purposes as ‘stateless’ companies85.  The issue here, is the fact that 
the ‘home office’ of ASI was non-existent in a physical manner, there were no offices, no employees or 
location.  Therefore, the minority of the profits attributable to Ireland were taxed while the majority of 
the profits were not subject to tax.  Due to those arrangements, Apple ended up paying an effective 
corporate tax rate of 1% in 2003 and 0.005% in 2014 on the profits of ASI instead of the 12.5% tax rate. 
It was also established that the same scheme of tax avoidance was almost identical with the AOE.86  
Again, there is an exploitation of both Irish and US laws. 
In 2014, the European Commission had announced its plans of conducting a formal 
investigation on transnational groups and their practices for tax purposes.  The European Commission 
conducted the investigation following the investigation of the US Senate Subcommittee in 201387.  The 
Subcommittee called Tim Cook (CEO of Apple Inc.) to testify regarding Apple’s tax practices in their 
Irish subsidiaries.  A few weeks after the testimony, the European Commission called Ireland to provide 
information regarding its tax ruling practice; in respect of the ASI and AOE Apple’s Inc. subsidiaries, as 
well as of any other resident company conducting similar activities.  Ireland submitted information for 
non-resident companies and the Commission requested detailed information of those tax rulings as well 
as all the tax rulings for the years 2010, 2011 and 2012.  Then again, Ireland delivered all the necessary 
information but the Commission requested the Apple’s rulings of 1991 and 2007.  After the examination 
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of the evidence, the Commission informed that it would conduct a formal investigation of the tax rulings 
issued by the Irish tax authorities in 1991 and 2007 in favor of ASI and AOE, and identify whether these 
rulings constituted a new state aid88.  More specifically, state aid is within the purpose of Article 107 of 
the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union.  Article 107 (1) TFEU prohibits “any aid granted 
by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to 
distort competition by favoring…in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible 
with the internal market”89.  The Article also identifies a list of compatible aids and potential compatible 
aids within the internal market. 
In its findings, European Commission made a preliminary conclusion that the two rulings, 
enabled lower tax liabilities and thus, can be considered as advantage over other companies based on 
Article 107 (1) TFEU.  More specifically, the advantage was found to be ‘selective’ since it involved only 
the Apple’s Inc. subsidiaries and ‘’it puts those undertakings in a more favourable position than other 
undertakings that are in a comparable factual and legal position’’90.  In addition, the Commission also 
established that this position was enabled by the Irish tax authorities and it went beyond the simple 
management of tax revenue.  Moreover, the Commission determined that the internal allocation of 
profits within ASI and AOE was artificial, with no factual or economic justification91.  Consequently, 
Ireland was in breach of Article 107 (1) and incompatible with Article 107 (2) and (3) which constitutes 
to a State aid92.  Another important element of the decision, is that the Apple’s strategies of allocating 
its profits to ASI and AOE did not appear to comply with the arm’s length principle.  More specifically, 
since transfer prices in the group, do not reflect those which would have been in under similar 
circumstances in unrelated companies, the application of the arm’s length principle is absent and a 
selective advantage on that company is conferred.  In addition, the arm’s length principle functions as 
a determinant factor of whether a company obtains a selective advantage due to its ability to reveal the 
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taxable base93.  It was also concluded that Ireland negotiated a “special tax treatment” with Apple in its 
1991 tax ruling (between 0.05% and 2% instead of 12.5%) rather than substantiated by reference to 
comparable transactions94.  The tax rulings assisted Apple in paying significantly less tax than other 
companies, which is illegal under EU state aid rules.  But most importantly, Ireland was found non-
compliant with Article 108 (3).  The provision of the Article provides that any Member State who wish to 
grant or alter aid, shall inform the Commission so it can review whether the aid is compatible with the 
internal market.  Then, the aid cannot be put into effect until the Commission provides a final decision95.  
Ireland failed to comply since the Commission was not aware of the aid and certainly was unable to 
review the aid before coming into effect96.  
Once those evidence on the tax techniques of Apple Inc. emerged and the subsequent breach 
of Article 108 (3), the Commission pursued a ‘recovery’ by virtue of Article 16 of Regulation (EU) 
2015/1589 concerning the granting of illegal state aid by tax rulings, from Ireland towards ASI and 
AOE97.  The Article provides that “fines and periodic penalty payments are not applicable to Member 
States, since they are under a duty to cooperate sincerely…and to provide the Commission with all 
information required to allow it to carry out its duties under this Regulation”98.  At the point that the 
Article was enforced in 2016, the Commission decided that Ireland had to recover the amount of €13 
billion plus interest for granting illegal tax benefits to the Apple’s Inc. Irish subsidiaries for the period of 
2003 till 2014. By the end of 2017, Ireland failed to pay the required amount for the illegal state aid and 
the European Commission referred the case to the European Court of Justice.  Both Apple and Ireland 
had appealed the decision of the European Commission but unfortunately for the two parties, the appeal 
was not successful.  Therefore, in 2018, the European Commission withdrew the case against Ireland 
after the payment of €14.3 billion (with interest being €1.3 billion) had been made99. 
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 Chapter 3: The Reforms and the Anti-Tax Avoidance Measures in the UK, USA AND EU 
Throughout the chapter, an analysis was given on the forms of non-compliance and more 
specifically, on tax strategies of transnational groups with the aim of avoiding tax liability.  Google LLC 
and Apple Inc. as prominent and illustrative examples, provided an insight of the issue of tax avoidance.  
To continue with, a more detailed approach on tax avoidance also necessitates the effect that those 
schemes have, in order to identify the extent of the issue. 
Effect of tax avoidance 
One of the foremost effects of tax avoidance is the significant loss of governmental revenues. 
Tax revenue is a vital component for the operations of the government.  It is essential for meeting its 
expenditures, reduce any deficits and for providing the essential services to the public as in every 
developed economy.  When transnational groups avoid tax liability through different corporate tax 
strategies, the amount of the tax liability remains unpaid.  Thus, it is rational to assume that if the tax 
gap (including the unpaid tax liabilities) is too high, government have the ability to implement budget 
cuts, increased taxes and other measures it thinks fit in order to maintain its stability.  Therefore, the 
tax liability is indirectly shifted to the citizens who are affected in a great extent.  Not only they will be 
affected by such measures, but they will also be discouraged from complying with their own tax liability.  
Moreover, during the past decade, citizens have expressed their opposition with tax avoidance schemes 
through countless of protests, campaigns and boycotts.   The excessive use of tax avoidance has also 
a considerable impact on small businesses.  While transnational groups operate in a debatable moral 
manner and practice tax avoidance schemes which are indirectly enabled by the government, small 
businesses end up paying more than their fair share of tax liability.  They also can get discouraged and 
engage if not in similar, in alternative or more suitable for them schemes.  It is obvious that there is an 
urgency to alter the existent laws and introduce measures specifically targeted on tax avoidance 
schemes and the people behind it.  The nature of tax avoidance, it is indeed questionable.  Although 
legal, the manipulation of the institutional structures does not only raises concerns about its morality, 
but also about its economic and social impact which is clearly detrimental.  The worst part is the fact 
that company law, does not only enable such schemes to operate, but also provides the legal tools 
which can be used or exploited by transnational groups and thereby, they are sowing the seeds of 
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inequality while undermining the legal system.  It is therefore undeniable, that there is a need for radical 
reforms. 
As we have established, there is an immense urgency for reforms.  Nevertheless, throughout 
the years, governments and organizations have addressed the issue of tax avoidance and other forms 
of non-compliance and there were constant attempts to establish measures, rules and legislation for 
tackling schemes which derived from the misuse of the legal system.  In the following chapter, those 
attempts will be explained and analyzed with the main focus being in the United Kingdom, the United 
States of America and Europe. 
United Kingdom 
Initial attempts and the enforcement of DOTAS 
In the United Kingdom, tax law has been targeted rather than purposive; in counteracting the 
exploitation of loopholes in the law, governments have legislated against individual avoidance schemes 
as and when these have come to light.  Often the response to this legislation has been the creation of 
new schemes to circumvent the law, which in turn has seen further legislation100.  In order to challenge 
this market, measures on countering tax avoidance have been emerging since the 1920’s.  More 
specifically, the incapability of the then, tax authorities to prosecute the taxpayers who avoided their tax 
liability followed by the absence of effective anti-tax avoidance legislation.  Thus, loopholes were 
generated which eventually were decreased by the relevant bodies101.  Throughout the years, there 
were many attempts on tackling tax avoidance; however, since the 1990’s, the increased amount of 
cross-border activity contributed significantly in the development of new measures.  In the late 1990’s 
the Labour Government consulted on a general anti-avoidance rule but it was rejected.  The increasing 
numbers of tax avoidance schemes triggered the Government into reexamining the idea of drafting new 
measures and by 2004, the government officially announced the formation of a new ‘disclosure regime’, 
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the DOTAS102.  DOTAS (Disclosure of Tax Avoidance Schemes) is a set of rules aiming to provide early 
information to HMRC regarding tax avoidance schemes.  Any ‘promoters’ who intend to sell tax 
avoidance schemes, need to disclose the relevant information to the HMRC before they derived to the 
taxpayers103.  The necessity of the regime is to provide the ability to the HMRC to track the schemes 
which operate, the ability to assess whether a scheme does not operate in the intended way and identify 
any loopholes that can be exploited by any such schemes.104   
The General Anti-Abuse Rule (GAAR) and the ‘Follower notices & accelerated payments’ 
Following the DOTAS, the government initiated the General Anti-Abuse Rule (GAAR) in 2013.  
The main policy objective of the GAAR ‘’is to deter taxpayers from entering into abusive arrangements, 
and to deter would-be promoters from promoting such arrangements.’’  Abusive arrangement within the 
scope of the rule, is the arrangement which “…cannot reasonably be regarded as a reasonable course 
of action in relation to the relevant tax provisions...”105. In addition, it focuses on the counteraction of 
intended tax advantages arising from tax arrangements that are abusive.  HMRC has the capacity to 
challenge these arrangements in their own discretion on the basis of other pieces of legislation, but if 
they cannot be classified as abusive, then they fall outside of the scope of the GAAR106.  In the case 
where an abusive tax avoidance arrangement is in force, GAAR opposes to that arrangement and 
provides a ‘just and reasonable’ tax adjustment 107 .  Nevertheless, the narrow scope of the rule 
constitutes difficult its application on something broader than abusive arrangements.  Therefore, a 
consultation has taken place (‘Raising the Stakes on Tax Avoidance’) in summer of 2013 and another 
one (‘Tackling Marketed Tax Avoidance’) in 2014 in an attempt to introduce measures with a broader 
nature and target specifically tax avoidance schemes.  Both consultations intended in challenging such 
schemes and changing the people and promoters conduct in relation to tax avoidance.  This led to the 
announcement of a new set of measures called ‘Follower notices & accelerated payments’ which were 
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eventually enacted in the Finance Act 2014 and the National Insurance Contributions Act 2015.  
Follower notice for the purpose of the Act, is a notice given by the HMRC to a person “who has used 
an avoidance scheme that has been shown in another person’s litigation to be ineffective”108.  Certain 
requirements need to be met and if no action is taken before the time given by the Act, the person is 
subjected to penalties109 as laid down in the sections 209-212 of the Act110.  In addition, accelerated 
payments for the purpose of the Act, are given to a person who engaged in a tax avoidance scheme 
and fulfil one or more conditions.  These are namely, the person acquires a follower notice as well, the 
person already used a DOTAS notifiable arrangement or the person is subject to a GAAR counteraction 
notice.  The accelerated payment is actually providing that the respective person must pay the 
necessary amount for engaging in such schemes111.   
Recent attempts 
In addition, all the aforementioned measures were altered and strengthen in the following years 
by other measures such as the Finance Bill 2016, the implementation of the OECD Action Plans and 
so on.  In its Budget 2018, the government announced a set of measures targeting tax avoidance and 
other forms of non-compliance.  More specifically, it was announced that from April 2020 a new form of 
tax will be presented, the Digital Services tax (DST).  This form of tax, will apply on certain digital 
corporations which their incomes will be subjected on a tax rate of 2% in order to ensure that the tax 
paid by the corporations is reflective of the derived value from the UK citizens.  It will be imposed on 
“search engines, social media platforms and online marketplaces” which are closely linked to UK users.  
A more detailed approach will be discussed in the Finance Bill 2019-20112.   
Furthermore, of significant importance is the legislation drafted in the Finance Bill of 2018-19 
and enforced in April 2019 namely, ‘offshore receipts in respect of intangible property’.  Based on the 
principles, the government taxes the income derived from intangible property (including intellectual 
property) which is being earned in low-tax jurisdictions and concern UK sales.  Instead of the application 
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of withholding tax, the tax is being collected directly from the offshore corporations.  Moreover, the 
meaning of income for the purpose of the measure also covers income arising from the “indirect 
exploitation of intangible property in the UK market through unrelated parties” and embedded royalties.  
However, it applies only to UK sales with a total value exceeding the £10 million but with some 
exceptions.  A set of anti-avoidance principles is also provided, with the aim to prevent arrangements 
from exploiting the measure to avoid charges113.  
In an attempt to extend the legal framework addressing tax avoidance schemes, the 
Government decided to publish an updated version of the ‘Offshore tax compliance strategy’ of 2014.  
In the publication (earlier this year), the substantial progress of the UK in eliminating and countering 
non-compliance schemes is noted. 
United States 
The Subpart F Rules 
United States have introduced its first set of anti-tax avoidance measures, Subpart F Rules in 
1962 (modified in 1986).  The rules were enacted “to prevent (or negate the tax advantage from) 
deflection of income, either from the United States or from the foreign country in which earned, into 
another jurisdiction which is a tax haven or which has a preferential tax regime for certain types of 
income.114”  In other words, the aim of the rules is to prevent taxpayers and corporations from artificially 
deferring their income through foreign corporations, established in low or no-tax jurisdictions.  Prior the 
enactment of the rules, many taxpayers and corporations engaged in such deferral schemes with the 
intention to reduce their tax liability and thus, the Congress attempted to restrict such practices by 
enacting the particular rules115.   
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The rules are only implemented if three elements are satisfied.  Firstly, there must be US 
shareholders (US citizens, domestic corporations or partnerships, domestic estates or trusts 116 ).  
Secondly, the US shareholders must be in controlled foreign corporations (CFCs) and thirdly, they must 
have a Subpart F income.  A CFC is any ‘foreign corporation’, if US shareholders own more than 50 
percent of the total combined voting power or total value of shares117  of such corporation.  The US 
shareholders are the ones who own 10 percent or more of the total combined voting or total value of 
shares of the respective corporation118.  Under the provisions of the rules, US shareholders must also 
have Subpart F income.  The Subpart F income is mainly divided into three categories; foreign personal 
holding company income (FPHCI), the foreign base company services income (FBC services income 
and the foreign base company sales income (FBCSI).  Firstly, the FPHCI includes mainly interest, 
dividends, rents and royalties with some exceptions119.  The FPCHI rules aim to prevent the unfair tax 
standpoint between CFCs who operate within the same country. Therefore, in order to counter this 
abuse, the US shareholders are obliged to include their pro-rata share of this income to their gross 
income every taxable year120.  Secondly, the FBC services income includes the income that is diverted 
to a low-tax country by using transactions of a related CFC and more specifically, by providing 
services121.  It is being treated in the same manner as FPHCI income.  Thirdly, the FBCSI includes 
income from the sale or purchase of tangible personal property outside of the CFC’s country of 
incorporation either for personal use or for the use of a related party122.  The objective of the FBCSI 
rules, is the preclusion of using CFC in order to shift sales income to foreign countries for the reduction 
of the US tax liability123.  To sum up, Subpart F grant to the US shareholders a number of obligations 
which will enable a fairer tax system.  The provisions consist of numerous rules and provisions, 
limitations and exemptions who aim the tackling of tax avoidance.  Nevertheless, there are some 
loopholes which can be exploited by corporations for tax purposes.  As we have established in the 
Google Inc. case, there are certain tricks like the ‘check the box’ rules in which corporations or 
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transnational groups can change the way that the entity is regarded for tax purposes.  Apple Inc. has 
also used the same technique and managed to avoid a significant amount of tax liability by establishing 
a FPHCI and a FBCSI.  The FPHCI ended up ‘disappearing’ due to the ability of Apple Inc. - enabled 
by law -, to regard its subsidiaries as disregarded separate legal entities.  Therefore, it is not compelled 
to report any transactions of disregarded entities and as a consequence, there is no taxable income124. 
 
The Tax Cut and Jobs Act 2017 
In addition, Subpart F was subjected to some modifications when in 2017, the USA president 
Donald Trump and fellow Republicans enacted the Tax Cut and Jobs Act.  The Act altered initially the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and as a consequence, had a great impact on the Subpart F rules.  The 
Act made significant changes that affect international and domestic corporations such as deductions, 
expensing, depreciation, tax credits and more tax items125.  Its main objective is the prevention of the 
‘deferral’ of otherwise taxable income through foreign corporations.  It also reduces in a great extent 
the income tax rate of corporations since currently is at 21% (was 35%).  Worth mentioning, is the fact 
that regarding the corporate income tax, US is no longer imposing taxes on the global income but on 
the territorial income.  To be more specific, when a corporation earns income from different jurisdictions 
(for example by subsidiaries), its income must be taxed in one of the jurisdictions.  In order to prevent 
multiple taxation, the respective country must have either a global tax system or a territorial one.  USA 
until recently, had a global tax system which imposed taxes on the domestic income and the foreign 
income of the US corporations.  In particular, USA allowed the US corporations to claim tax credits to 
counterbalance their foreign income taxes.  It also granted the permission to the US corporations to 
“defer tax on active profits earned by CFCs until those profits were repatriated to the parent company”.   
In contrast, after the enactment of the Tax Cut and Jobs Act, the imposition of taxes is only attributed 
to the corporation income that derives within the US.  Regarding transnational groups, the impact will 
mainly fall on the subsidiaries since they will be subjected to taxation only in the jurisdiction in which 
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they are legally established.  Consequently, the difference between the rates of taxation within the 
respective jurisdictions will be balanced126.   
To sum up, the introduction of the Act has clearly the intention of restructuring the whole US 
tax system.  Nevertheless, even if it is enacted to address the transfer of untaxable income and 
ultimately, tackling tax avoidance, it was subjected to criticism.  This is due to the fact that transnational 
groups (for example Google and Apple) will be even more benefited by the new provisions of the Act.  
It is estimated that such groups accumulated approximately $3 trillion in foreign jurisdictions and tax 
havens without being subjected to US taxes.  It is undeniable that the provisions of the Act, will gradually 
force the money back to the USA but the issue is in what tax rate they will be taxed.  Taking into 
consideration the changes, they will not obviously be taxed on the 35% but neither on the anyway low 
21%.  They will be imposed to a tax rate of 8% to 15.5%127.  The question of whether the Act will indeed 
facilitate in the elimination of tax avoidance remains uncertain. 
European Union 
EU Competence 
Before examining the anti-tax avoidance measures of the European Union, it is important to 
understand the institutional framework by which the EU legislates in the field of taxation and the 
associated restrictions on its operation.  The EU is, in principle, only able to adopt legislative acts for 
those areas which it has been given equivalent competence by the Treaties.  Every legislative act must 
be centered on the legal basis provided by the Treaty.  Nevertheless, it is well known that Member 
States have fully retained their competence in the field of direct taxation and there is no specific legal 
basis for developing EU legislative action in this area.  For the few direct legislative actions taken by 
the EU in this field, Article 115 and Article 352 TFEU functioned as the basis of their competence128.  In 
particular, according to Article 115 TFEU, the Council may adopt laws (after the consultation of the 
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relevant bodies in unanimity) for the approximation of laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
of the Member States which have a direct impact on the establishment or functioning of the internal 
market129. The laws must necessarily be in the form of a Directive.  Article 352 TFEU provides that the 
European Union can still act when necessary, even if it is not within its powers given by the Treaty, after 
unanimity and consent from the relevant bodies130.   
First attempt: Council Directives 
Moving on, in its competence, the EU have made some attempts in eliminating tax avoidance 
practices.  Firstly, a Directive implemented in 1990 which was repealed by the Council Directive 
2009/133/EC (Tax Merger Directive).  Member States are able to opt-out from provisions which they 
think fit, if the implementation of provisions of the Directive result in tax avoidance practices 131 .  
Secondly, another Directive implemented in 1990 and repealed by the Council Directive 2011/96/EU 
(Parent-Subsidiary Directive)132  which was imposed changes in 2015 and thirdly, the Council Directive 
2003/49/EC (Interest and Royalty Payments Directive)133.  All three Directives, have designated clauses 
which allow the exclusion of certain provisions by the Member States if necessary, in an attempt to 
prevent the abuse of the rights deriving from each Directive.   
Second Attempt: The Council Directive 2016/1154 
In addition, in 2016, the EU introduced the Council Directive 2016/1164 (ATAD) which differs 
significantly in scope, objectives and function in comparison with the former Directives on the field.  The 
former Directives, by providing anti-abuse clauses, merely ensured that the provisions would not be 
abused for the purposes of tax avoidance or tax evasion while ATAD on the other hand, targets 
specifically tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market134.  Its main 
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objective is to “restore trust in the fairness of tax systems and allow governments to effectively exercise 
their tax sovereignty”135. It is also a part of a broader initiative, the ‘Anti-tax avoidance Package’ which 
aims to address a number of matters raised initially by the OECD against Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (BEPS).  ATAD functions as a supplement to the Action Plan which OECD had already 
introduced as a response to the need of a fairer taxation136 and establish in the form of hard law, the 
proposed actions of the BEPS.   The content of ATAD focusses on five measures; the limits on interest 
deductions, the exit taxation, the general anti-abuse rule, the controlled foreign company rule and the 
hybrid mismatches.   
The measures can be then differentiated in to two categories.  The measures which aim the 
tackling of the BEPS and they are also included in the OECD Action Plan (limits on interest deductions, 
the controlled foreign company rule and the hybrid mismatches and then, the additional measures 
initiated by the ATAD and were not encompassed by the OECD (exit taxation and the general anti-
abuse rule).  In addition, one of the five measures is the interest limitation rule in Article 4 of the Directive. 
The purpose of the aforementioned rule is to prevent transnational groups from engaging in tax base 
erosion practices by shifting profits, and in particular to prevent the groups from using interest payments 
from corporations based in high corporate tax jurisdictions towards corporations within the same group 
which are based in low corporate tax jurisdictions or to third parties. Under the Article, it is established 
that “exceeding borrowing costs shall be deductible in the tax period in which they are incurred only up 
to 30 percent of the taxpayer's earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA)”137.  
Nevertheless, an exemption is allowed, whereby all borrowing costs up to €3 million will be deducted 
(de minimis rule), and deduction of full borrowing costs if the taxpayer is a standalone entity138 (“is not 
a part of a consolidated group for financial accounting purposes and has no associated enterprise or 
permanent establishment”139).  Furthermore, Member States may, optionally firstly, to recognize the 
right to a full deduction of the excess borrowing costs of a corporation that is a member of a consolidated 
group if its share capital to all its assets is equal to or higher than the corresponding percentage the 
group, or otherwise recognize a right to partial deduction of the excess borrowing costs, subject to 
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conditions.  Secondly, Member States may lay down rules for the transfer at a later date or earlier of 
the excess borrowing costs which are prohibited from deducting during the fiscal year in which they 
arise140. 
Soft Law: The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development – BEPS and 
Guidelines 
Moving on, it is essential to analyze the work of OECD in order to enable a more coherent 
comprehension of the ATAD.  The transfer pricing and the arm’s length principle were focal points in 
the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project initiated by the OECD and endorsed by the G20 
(an international forum in the form of summits, where governments and other members discuss the 
promotion of international financial stability and related issues)141.  Under the OECD/G20 Inclusive 
Framework on BEPS, most countries in the world join forces to cease tax avoidance strategies and 
schemes.  At this point, is essential to establish the meaning of BEPS.  It is defined as: “strategies that 
exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to artificially shift profits to low or no-tax locations where there 
is a little or no economic activity or to erode tax bases through deductible payments such as interest or 
royalties”142.  Even if the definition is straightforward, the legality of such strategies is not always evident.  
However, this does not change the fact that by practicing BEPS, transnational groups have a 
competitive advantage over domestic enterprises and such strategies, undermine the equality and the 
integrity of the tax systems.  Furthermore, it also undermines all the taxpayers who are willingly paying 
their tax liabilities143.  The BEPS Inclusive Framework, consists of 15 actions; addressed to every 
government involved and composed of rules and instruments.  Some of the actions are: tax challenges 
arising from digitalization, limitation on interest deductions, harmful tax practices, prevention of tax 
treaty abuse, transfer pricing and country-by-country reporting144.  The significance of the participation 
of the countries in the implementation of the articles, lies in to the fact that corporate tax (and mainly 
from transnational groups) is an integral part of any country’s revenues.  Hence, the imposition of the 
articles, will ensure that the appropriate taxation will be enforced on profits resulting from genuine and 
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not artificial economic activities.  Then, a higher degree of tax transparency could be achieved since 
exchanging information in a global level, enables an easier detection of illegal tax related schemes145.   
The OECD after the BEPS project, had also initiated a revision of the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines as we have already established in the previous chapter.  The Guidelines in the 2017 edition, 
incorporate changes that reflect the Actions of the BEPS project.  Their main purpose is to help tax 
administrations and transnational groups, by promoting mutually satisfactory solutions in cases 
regarding transfer pricing and therefore, eliminate conflicts that may arise and costly litigation 
procedures.  They also examine whether the transnational groups’ methods and the conditions of their 
commercial and financial relations comply with the arm’s length principle and discuss the practical 
application of those methods146.  
 
CHAPTER 4: An Evaluation of the current Anti-Tax Avoidance Measures 
United Kingdom 
By taking into consideration everything up to this point, there are certain assumptions that need 
to be established.  To begin with, since 2010, UK have introduced more than one hundred measures 
targeting tax avoidance and a few more in its last two Budgets147.  Moreover, it has a set a record in the 
percentage of the tax gap which was estimated at 5.6% for 2018 noting a long-term reduction in the 
overall unpaid liabilities148.  The introduction of DOTAS, GAAR and the ‘Follower notices & Accelerated 
Payments’ were the first attempts into countering forms of non-compliance.  DOTAS was widely 
successful as it increased the information that the HMRC was able to receive and any possible 
deficiencies were reduced due to the constant consultations and amendments of the regime.  In regards 
to the GAAR, as mentioned before, its narrow scope constitute its application limited to abusive 
arrangements and not tax avoidance in a broader manner.  In addition, other measures are still not 
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enforced or they will be enforced later this year.  Nevertheless, it has been observed that the HMRC 
does not do enough to tackle companies which exploit international tax structures to minimize UK tax 
liabilities.  The Committee of Public Accounts, in its report ’HMRC’s progress in improving tax 
compliance and preventing tax avoidance’ established that after some changes in the tax regime, OECD 
and the European Commission have criticized and characterised their tax practises as ‘harmful’.  This 
is due to their assertion that such practices facilitate transnational groups into avoiding paying tax in the 
jurisdictions where they make a profit.  In the report, it is also stated that other international tax experts 
believe that the “economic benefits for the UK are minimal”149.  Furthermore, in a study conducted by 
the Office for Budget Responsibility in 2017, it was established that HMRC costings of anti-avoidance 
and operation measures (between 2012 till 2016) “have fallen short of the original estimates by amounts 
that vary between 15 and 65 per cent”.  The characteristic uncertainty around anti-avoidance and 
operational measures, combined with the growing reliance that Governments have placed on them to 
satisfy the relatively certain cost of tax cuts and additional spending, make this a continuing risk to the 
central forecast150.    
United States 
In the United States, the introduction of Subpart F and the Tax Cut and Jobs Act constituted 
the most recent attempts of counteracting tax avoidance schemes.  Although they initiated a large 
number of new provisions which altered significantly the US tax system, in tax avoidance terms, they 
remained unsatisfactory.  Subchapter F, which was heavily exploited by transnational groups, was 
altered when the TCJA came into force.  Nevertheless, there were not any provisions specifically 
targeting tax avoidance and the implementation of the rules failed to address the advantage of the 
corporations given by the IRS, the ‘entity classification election’.  On the other hand, the Act provided 
two main changes on corporate taxes which could affect schemes of non-compliance.  Firstly, the 
reduction of the corporate tax from 35% to 21% and secondly, the income which is taxed based on the 
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new territorial tax system.  The former can benefit corporations as they are going to be subjected a 
lower corporate tax rate while the latter will prevent multiple taxation.  Therefore, most tax breaks were 
left intact and the outcome was a decline in the corporate tax revenues.  In 2018, a year after the 
enactment of the Act, the revenues reduced by 31% 151. 
European Union 
The EU established many initiatives for tackling tax avoidance. The first attempt was in the form 
of Directives; however, they do not target tax avoidance specifically and they only contain clauses in 
relation to that.  The first major initiative of the EU was the ‘Anti-tax avoidance Package’ which the 
Directive 2016/1154 coupled with the OECD/G20 BEPS project152.  Tax avoidance is an issue high in 
the EU agenda and in political priority since it concerns all Member States and can prevent a fair single 
market.  One of the objectives of the EU in relation to taxation, is the growth and the promotion of tax 
transparency.  Tax transparency is a vital component on fighting tax avoidance and currently it is in a 
low level.  This lack of transparency can facilitate and even encourage tax practices by certain 
corporations, as it can mean that these practices go unobstructed.  Member States may not be aware 
of other countries’ tax regimes effect on their own. It also means that ambiguities and law omissions 
between national tax regimes go unnoticed and they can be exploited by individuals or corporations 
who intend to lessen their tax liability153.  Transparency is also one of the main objectives of the BEPS 
Project.  The BEPS Project progress report which was published earlier this year, identifies the progress 
that has been made since 2018.  It establishes that since the introduction of the Action 13, there has 
been an ‘important milestone towards transparency’154.  The Action 13 imposes a requirement in all 
transnational groups, to draft a country-by-country (CbC) report with the collective data on the 
international allocation of income, profit, taxes and economic concerning the tax countries in which it 
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functions.  This report is then, shared between the respective jurisdictions in order to use it “in high level 
transfer pricing and BEPS risk assessments”155.  The first exchanges occurred last year and till now, 80 
countries have introduced CbC reporting filing obligation. In general, 2 000 relationships between 
jurisdictions have been formulated for the exchange of CbC reports. Tax authorities are currently able 
to access to unprecedented and reliable information on the biggest foreign transnational groups, which 
are usually the ones that pose the highest probable BEPS risk to their jurisdictions, in regards to their 
size and the probable income at stake156.  In addition, it was announced that there are plans of a 
‘Programme of Work to Develop a Consensus Solution to the Tax Challenges Arising from the 
Digitalisation of the Economy’ which will attain a long-term solution by the end of 2020157.  Corporate 
tax transparency provides the connection between taxation and real economic activity and it can be 
considered one of the solutions which can potentially tackle tax avoidance. 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, transnational groups have a dramatically important role in today’s economy.  
More and more citizens and corporations are engaging in non-compliance schemes in order to eliminate 
their tax liabilities. Governments need to ensure that the taxable profits of the transnational groups, are 
not artificially shifted out of their jurisdiction and that the tax base reported by the groups in their country 
reflects the economic activity undertaken therein.  Undoubtedly, one of the main reasons for this 
phenomenon, is the tax breaks that the law unintentionally grants to both citizens and corporations.  
Tax avoidance, in a great extent, has the power to affect economic and political foundations, the citizens’ 
compliance, distort the competition among corporations and more importantly, the revenue of the 
respective jurisdiction.  In the thesis, the two of the many real life examples of engagement in tax 
avoidance schemes that were provided, aimed to demonstrate the severity of the issue and the urgent 
need for anti-tax avoidance measures.  Anti-tax avoidance measures play a key role in the tackling of 
tax avoidance.  Governments, even if they initiated rules, principles or statutes, should take into 
consideration all the elements that enable the participation in such schemes.  In addition, they also 
                                                          
155 OECD, Action 13 Country-by-Country Reporting at <https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-
actions/action13/> accessed on 30 August 2019 
156 OECD Report (n154) 
157 Ibid. 2 
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need to identify the reasoning behind it.  In order to establish effective measures which will counteract 
against tax avoidance, there is a need to find the mechanisms which encourage it.  It is clear that due 
to the complex structure of transnational groups and the multiplicity of the jurisdictions involved, the 
reduction of those schemes is hard work.  There is an outstanding number of measures who aimed to 
raise the compliance with the tax system but as it was established, there is a long way to achieve the 
desired outcome.  Nevertheless, as it was seen in the thesis, there are some relatively new measures 
which are yet to be enforced.  Possible reforms could be the imposition of sanctions and penalties, with 
a broad nature in order to eliminate the number of citizens engaging in abusive practices.  One of the 
reasons of citizens’ non-compliance is their lack of trust to the system.  By providing the necessary 
information to the citizens, the importance and the purpose of the taxation, as well as the necessity to 
respect and abide with the law, growth and prosperity will be achieved. Furthermore, a thorough 
examination of the relevant tax law would be ideal, in order to identify the exact omissions or ‘loopholes’ 
in the law which are being used.  In a European level, Member States can be encouraged to incorporate 
in their own national legislation the EU rules which are provided.  Achieving sound and coherent reforms, 
will result in a reduction of the non-compliance schemes.  But even if this is the case, would we ever be 
able to find a solution targeting at transnational groups given their complexity? 
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